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Abstract
De/re/centitng of subjective power
The centred self is the self in the centre of the universe with an underlying 
inner centre; that is, with one of the human abilities as the core power of 
the human being. I apply this distinction to the meta-psychological theories 
of Kenneth Gergen and Charles Taylor. Gergen liquidates the autonomous 
individual only to revert to a centring of the social side of the human 
condition. It is, according to Gergen, the postmodern condition of advanced 
transport and communication technologies that will be the end of the 
authentic self. Gergen rejects the possibility of resisting these postmodern 
technologies. The upshot of Gergen’s socio-technological determinism is 
totalitarianism as well as agonism between individual and social aspects. 
Taylor seemingly steers away from centring one aspect. He nevertheless 
partially centres intention (interpretation). This gives his de/centring also an 
undecided and agonistic picture; that is a self in a never-ending conflict 
with itself and surroundings. I suggest that only a re-centring of all human 
abilities will avert the final failure of the decentring of the centred self.
1. Proem
Postmodernism represents an uprising against the autonomous and 
objectifying modern individual who manipulates, dominates and even 
oppresses his natural environment, fellow humans and parts of itself -  
this is the decentring of the centred self. My hunch is that the ontological 
positions of monism and dualism are at the root of the practice of 
centring because monism/dualism deify one or two aspects of the human 
condition which contributes to the tendency towards domination and 
oppression. The question is whether postmodern decentrings are able to 
identify and go beyond these constructs.
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2. What is de/centring?
According to Gruber (1989:189-192) theorising is an activity with its locus 
in the subject and assumes that the “theory’s involvement with the object 
is limited and relatively safe”. Theorising “does not invent or manufacture 
the object ex nihilo”. However, Gruber claims, this changes “dramatically 
when theory turns its attention to the subject itself. In this relation, 
subjects “contribute to the object so that the object as it is known bears 
the marks of the subject’s activity”. However, says Gruber, the subject 
usually “obscures its own role in manufacturing”. It is here, he says that 
postmodern investigations “into the emergence of the subject” recover 
that “which theory tends to forget about itself. Now, Gruber too seems to 
have amnesia about the influence of the knowing subject on objects 
exterior to itself. Glas (1995:72), for instance, argues that one of the 
central problems of the classical view of the self is “the dialectic between 
me and the other” where “the other appears as an object opposite to me, 
to be appropriated, brought under control, and even dominated reflec­
tively”. This statement characterises the self as the objectifier, controller, 
dominator and even creator of anything outside itself, that is the whole 
extra-self universe. The postmodern notion of decentring indeed excels 
in this broader type of critique1.
Both the philosopher Charles Taylor and the psychologist Kenneth 
Gergen target especially the Romantic and Enlightenment versions of the 
centred self in their critique. According to Gergen (1992:60-61) we derive 
from Romanticism “our beliefs in a profound and stable center of identity
-  a center which harbored the vital spirit of life itself. However, Gergen 
argues, “for most people the romance with romanticism has cooled”. The 
fascination with the “deep interior” is lost and we turned some time ago to 
“the demands and opportunities made possible by technology” that will 
give us the “mastery” to create “a Utopian world”. For this we “needed 
conscious capability for keen observation and careful reason”. Currently, 
however, not “only do soul, passion, and creativity become suspicious as 
centers of human existence, but so does rational thought and the 
efficient control of one’s own actions”. Taylor (1989a:461-463, 472-481) 
describes the demise of Enlightenment and Romantic views in more or 
less the same terms. However, where Gergen especially sees the 
demise of the modern self as a decentring of the Romantic self, Taylor 
tries rather to retain something Romantic and targets the Enlightenment 
self for his decentring. Taylor (1985a:132-135) detects a resistance to 
what he calls the “disengaged se lf of modernism. The “disengaged se lf
1 See Liberman (1989:127-129) and Schurmann (1979:167-174) for a general 
description of this critique.
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is the self “whose defining aspirations, values and loyalties are de­
termined out of himself, and not in reference to anything outside”. This 
being sees the world around him simply as “raw material for his pro­
ductive purposes”. This model is challenged because of its “disastrous 
consequences, ecological and social”. For Taylor this self is “inhuman” in 
the sense “that it cuts us off from the sources of community, creativity, 
and human feeling”.
In my analysis I will use the following concept of centring and decentring: 
Decentring, in general, attempts to uproot any foundational authority. 
According to Davis and Schleifer (1992:159-162) the centre that bases 
all other content, elements and concepts is seen by the classical 
philosophical tradition as an unchanging essence, epistemological 
immovable point as well as origin and point of control of all other beings 
in a particular system. If the self is centred, it originates and controls 
everything. Furthermore, this self usually has a power centre in itself. 
The latter distinction means that we are dealing with a double centring 
and postmodern decentring of the self2. The image of a self in the centre- 
control of other beings can be called the inter-centred self. Decentring 
thus implies that heteronomous influences on the self and his behaviour 
are emphasised alongside the autonomous power of the self3. But the 
self is also seen to be centred in itself -  that its power is contracted in 
one of its aspects, functions or capacities. This is the intra-centring of the 
self. A single human aspect is declared the true core and power of the 
human being and the other functions are disclosed as offshoots of this 
root4.1 will argue that the inter-centred self can in a sense be seen as the 
consequence of the more primal intra-centred self5. More precisely, what 
is seen as the intra-centred power of the self, determines the nature of 
the power of the inter-centred self. For instance, reason as the strong 
central capacity creates the illusion that the human being has the
2 Francke (1993:7) summarised the difference as follows: "In the metaphor of the 
'decentring of the subject’ the word ‘o f has two meanings, which are interconnected. 
First, it has the sense of a genetivus subjectivus the subject itself has moved away 
from the centre. Secondly, in the sense of genetivus possessivus, the subject has lost 
its centre in itself".
3 I have encountered this concept of centring/decentring in the work of the following 
writers: Middleton and Walsh (1995:48), Sheridan (1980:92-93) and Mark Taylor 
(1987:44).
4 See Middleton and Walsh (1995:48) and Smith (1988:xxx) for the notion of the intra­
centred self.
5 Mark Taylor (1987:44) and Sheridan (1980:92) hint at the primacy of the intra-centred 
self in the process of centring
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strength to be the centre of everything else by means of science and 
technology. Decentring in this instance means that the power of the self 
is no longer seen to be situated in a single power point inside the self. 
This is a very important correction because to situate subjective power in 
only one human aspect, to declare this the real self and to see it as the 
creator as well as the control centre of the universe, is a huge reduction 
of the plurality of human functions, as well as a distorted and inflated 
expectation of the power of a single human capacity. It is this thesis I will 
pursue in the thinking of both Gergen and Taylor.
3. Centring of social relationships
Gergen (1991:3, 7, 49, 61, 68, 69, 73, 74) claims that the postmodern 
condition consists essentially of new technologies of mass communi­
cation and transport that make “it possible to sustain relationships -  
either directly or indirectly -  with an ever-expanding range of other 
persons”. This will lead us to what he calls “a state of social saturation”. 
This saturation will be the “acquisition of multiple and disparate potentials 
for being”, which means “multiphrenia” is set in motion. Multiphrenia 
refers to the “splitting of the individual into a multiplicity of self­
investments” which will be the end of the centred self.
However, we should probe deeper than the postmodern condition for 
Gergen’s version of social determinism. Social determinism is, in 
Gergen’s case, probably the heritage of an older generation of 
psychologists. It is, according to the environmentalist/behaviourist B.F. 
Skinner (1972:184, 185, 188, 192, 205, 211), especially the exterior 
circumstances of a person that determines her behaviour. He rejects the 
traditional idea that “the autonomous agent” controls his environment. 
The human being should be seen as “controlled by the world around him, 
and in large part by other men”. According to Clouser (1991:154-155) 
this social determinism sees the “needs of society as the standard for 
psychological normalcy”. It forces us to “regard every leader, political or 
religious, who actually did achieve social superiority as abnormal”. In 
fact, social determinism “rules out raising the question as to whether a 
society itself may be abnormal”. These difficulties are even visible in 
Skinner’s (1972:205-207) own terms. He asks whether the individual who 
is controlled by his social environment is “not then simply a victim”. He 
agrees that “men have been victims” but adds that they also have “been 
victimizers”. The human being may be controlled by his environment but 
“it is an environment which is almost wholly of his own making”. We are 
dealing here with “a kind of gigantic exercise in self-control”. Skinner 
nevertheless declares that there is “nothing inconsistent” about being 
both victim and victimizer. Not so, says Botha (1990:136); Skinner will
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not evade a paradox between subjective capabilities through the practice 
of science and being the victim of his cultural creations.
The question is whether Gergen’s social constructionism/constructivism 
will be able to evade these questionable side-effects of his predecessors. 
Gergen does not see the destruction of the self as a loss which causes 
Grodin (1992:186-187) to question his commitment to postmodernism. 
She says that if “postmodernism opens up to the potential for new ways 
of constructing the self, including ways that could incorporate models of 
autonomy, it was unclear why individuals wouldn’t attempt to maintain a 
sense of a distinct self even in a relational context”. This freedom, 
however, is not the kind of possibility Gergen has in mind when he 
advocates the liberties of the new lifestyle. According to Gergen (1991: 
150-153; 1992:62-63), the attempt to be true to an essence, an authentic 
self is a hang-up of modernism. The thoroughly postmodern person looks 
at multiphrenia and its technologies with the sense of “an enormous 
increase in the possibilities for human development”. Every new relation 
is seen as “an open door to growth of expression, appreciation, and skill”.
Wexler (1992:1752) questions Gergen’s positive evaluation of the 
postmodern condition by claiming that people do not welcome the 
“dissolution of earlier social and self certainties”. In fact, he says, “across 
class differences in cultural substance, everyday life is characterized by 
an evermore difficult struggle to establish a secure and integral self­
identity in the face of social contradiction and disintegration”. Gergen 
(1991:199-201) however, is unrepentant. He recognises that beliefs in “a 
core se lf, “moral values” and “emotional capacities” remain “robust 
mainstays of Western culture”. Nevertheless, he argues, “there is little 
reason to suspect that calls to defensive action will succeed”. This belief 
is, once again, due to Gergen’s deterministic social constructivist 
assumption that we simply do not have the inner resources to resist. 
Gergen tries to make the postmodern condition responsible for this lack. 
He argues that in “the longer run, though, the technologies giving rise to 
social saturation will be inescapable” (Gergen, 1991:200). The sense of 
totalitarian terror of this latter statement is too strong to ignore; we are all 
going to be the victims of the technologies of social saturation.
What went wrong in Gergen's postmodern decentring of the self? The 
decentring of the self, considering the repressive power and reductive 
unity of the traditional centred self, seems a necessary action. However, 
in radical decentrings it also has the dangerous potential of a full turn to a 
heteronomously determined self. In the act of decentring, the centre is 
not supposed to be simply substituted by the periphery. Taylor (1989a: 
456) also criticises the current decentring of the self for creating a new 
centre; it is the “displacing of the center of interest onto language, or onto
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poetic transmutation itself, or even dissolving the self as usually 
conceived in favour of some new constellation”. This danger is openly 
accepted by a fore-runner of postmodern thinking; structuralist anthro­
pology. According to Bakker (1982:91) this view says kinship systems 
function as the originating subject. The individual human being is then 
the object on whom the formation is done. The individual subject has no 
substance and autonomy. This, however, is a suspicious description of 
the experience of human life. Humans indeed experience episodes of 
disempowerment but this need not be a kind of transcendental condition. 
Now, the tendency towards disempowerment of the self by means of 
reverse centring is also a constant danger in postmodern attempts, like 
that of Gergen, to explain behaviour. Gergen replaces the shallow 
rational self of modernism with a social condition that is supposed to be 
the supreme locus for human behaviour. At the end of this road, 
however, he also finds the terror of the self centred on one dimension of 
his condition.
A better end to the story of centring and decentring would have been a 
concept in which there is a simultaneous and equitable empowerment of 
the traditional self and non-self in the human domain (i.e. of all aspects of 
the human condition). Davis and Schleifer (1992:162-164) emphasise 
this when they point out that the postmodern deconstruction intends to 
upset hierarchies like that between autonomy and society. This may 
necessitate an initial stage in which a simple reversal of the centre and 
margin takes place. However, they say, the process should not stop 
here. In the second phase, the whole hierarchical relation must be done 
away with. It should end in an “undecidability” ; in a free play of inter­
pretation without truth and origin. The conclusion in the second phase, 
however, suspiciously sounds like a re-centring on the subjective power 
of interpretation -  something I will get in better focus by discussing 
Taylor’s thinking. A better perspective would be one in which the idea of 
a centred self is deconstructed but the questions, which have led to the 
centring, are still answered. The two questions that have caused the 
centring of the self are about the unity of the self and about the power of 
the self. The intra-centred self is an attempt to tell us how the self finds 
unity in itself as well as how the self maintains and affirms its position in 
the world. This, I believe, can still be done without resorting to a re­
centring of a single human aspect but yet empowering the entire human 
being.
In Gergen’s case, it is not only the social aspect of human life that is 
centred. Combined with it, he centres a life-style. Gergen (1991:200) 
admits that his description of the postmodern lifestyle is limited to the 
“more urban, mobile, professional, affluent, and aspiring”. This, he says 
is merely the vanguard of a global development of social saturation.
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Smith (1994:406) tries to give a sobering perspective by saying that “it is 
essential to remember that for the great majority of people, the existential 
perils that trouble the elite are eclipsed by real perils of survival and 
damage control” . However, he also agrees that everyone will eventually 
“encounter the same threats to integral selfhood that now affect the 
affluent”. Wexler (1992:1752), however, senses in Gergen’s “communi­
catory and relational revolution” a “cultural arrogance -  within a wider 
‘context’ of a social structure of inequality and immiserization”. Russell 
and Gaubatz (1995:389) discerned something related to this danger. It 
“may also be true that the material effects of these discourses first impact 
the elite” they say. But, they add, “postmodern discourses, like theo­
retical discourses in the past, come to affect individuals who, by design 
or otherwise, are kept dangerously unaware of the concerns of the elite”. 
An example is architecture. During modernism architects “impose order 
on what was then perceived as the morally debilitating clutter and 
disorganizations of traditional cities”. Their high-rise modernist buildings, 
however, disrupted the community lives of the poor in inner-cities. 
Postmodern architects plan to change this once again. In this case too, 
“postmodern theory, like modernism before it, may impose its greatest 
effects on those least familiar with its discourses". Thus, Gergen’s 
deterministic social constructivist assumption has the danger of making 
us all the victims of a new inter-centring of Western yuppie style 
postmodernism.
Despite the strong totalitarianism in Gergen’s thinking, there are also 
signs that he experiences the loss of the self in his thinking negatively. 
Gergen (1991:187-189) asks whether cynicism about truth claims should 
be the “necessary reaction to the loss of authenticity”. This is a real 
temptation he says because it will give the postmodern person the sense 
of “self-contented superiority”. However, he says, this is “a debilitating 
elixir, rendering one inactive and alienated”. A strategy that tries to avoid 
cynicism is the attempt to “play with the truths of the day”. We should act 
as if they are the truth but do not take terms like reality, authenticity, 
truth, etc. seriously. However, says Gergen (1991:193-194, 196), this 
playful attitude is also unsatisfying. It can be “demeaning” if play, wit or 
irony is your only reactions. You can make a fool of your intellectual 
opponents, but how will you respond to the death of a child or life in a 
cancer ward? You cannot, not take it seriously. He therefore contradicts 
his radical promotion of a non-self postmodernism by promoting “some 
form of compromise" between “the desire on the one hand to abandon 
the destructive potential of romanticist and modernist discourses, and on 
the other, to stop short of myth turned sour?”. Gergen’s synthesis is to 
“envision the possibility of serious play”. It is as if some “transcendental 
truth” makes a claim on Gergen’s sense of responsibility. The En­
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lightenment self with its rational and observational abilities that gains 
access to the “truth” returns, albeit vaguely, in Gergen6.
The return of an originating self also appears in another aspect of 
Gergen’s thinking. Gergen (1999:7-10) claims that his questioning of the 
inner self portrays a “‘transformationist bias’, that is, a continuous 
championing of the new, the expanded and the revolutionary as opposed 
to the accepted, the traditional, and secure”. Psychology has to play a 
“significant role in augmenting or expanding the culture’s resources”. 
This means that the “scholar abandons the problematic role of describing 
‘what is the case’, and sets out to forge languages favoring what may 
become”. Underlying this sentiment, there is a reach for the self of 
Romanticism and its creative capacity to go beyond the current limits of 
the exterior environment. For Gergen the revolutionary nature of his 
postmodern viewpoint is what attracts him to it. However, this 
revolutionary or poetic activism also creates a paradox in his thinking 
between the end of the self and its Romantic return as the creative 
genius7.
4. The centring of interpretation
Gergen tries to decentre the self by declaring it dead due to the 
postmodern condition. This decentring, however, fails because Gergen 
recentre the self around a creative social aspect. The question now is 
whether Taylor will do a better job of decentring the self without 
dehumanising it. Promising is that Taylor is reknown for defending, to 
some extent, the inner self.
Taylor (1985a:164,166,169-170,173-174) formulates his position in terms 
of the two horns of a dilemma that makes both body and mind the origins 
of action: On the one hand, he says, “there is no blanket argument to the 
inconceivability of mechanism”; that is an account “in terms of body 
chemistry and neurophysiology”. On the other hand, however, Taylor 
also acknowledges that “common sense is alarmed by the prospect of a 
complete mechanistic account of behaviour”. Surely, goes his argument, 
“our having goals is essentially involved in our being creatures capable of 
freedom and responsibility”. Therefore, Taylor (1968:127; 1970a&b:58, 
75, 94) asks, if both types -  intentional and mechanistic explanations of
6 Gergen’s concept of serious play is also for Smith (1994:408) and Wood (1992:425) 
an indication of an “ambivalence" or “an authentically conflicted person".
7 Referring to Foucault and Derrida, Taylor (1989b:482) also senses this paradox in 
postmodern thinking.
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behaviour -  seem to apply, “which has the greater explanatory power”. 
Taylor favours a balanced view where “mechanist and purposive 
explanations can co-exist”. Taylor (1967:209) furthermore hierarchises 
(or centres) explanations of behaviour according to the situation to which 
it applies. In the case of certain pathological conditions, for instance, “the 
most fruitful explanation seems to lie on a physiological or biochemical 
level”. However, there are other “ranges of behaviour” where intentional 
explanations are better. Taylor (1970a:57-58, 63, 72-73, 75-76) therefore 
argues that the answer about which explanation takes priority cannot be 
established a priori, but must be done “empirically”.
Taylor is nevertheless well-known for his hermeneutical approach to the 
human sciences with a concomitant emphasis on the interpreting aspect 
of the human being. Thus, the question is whether he will be consistent 
in rejecting a fixed hierarchy in the explanation of behaviour. At certain 
times he gives a very strong sense of a fixed hierarchy in the explanation 
of behaviour. Taylor (1970a:72-74; 1980:62-63; 1985a:206-207) declares 
for instance that intentional and purposive behaviour are too complex to 
explain on a neurological level. He remarks that when any form of 
“higher” or more “complex behaviour” enters, no empirical observation is 
really going to convince us that the more basic level of explanation could 
be mechanistic.
For some of his critics, Taylor is plainly an exponent of so-called agency 
theory, that is a position that centres the locus of the subject in the 
capacity to give intention to action (Scarrow, 1981:23-24; De Sousa, 
1988:422-423). To understand this characterisation of Taylor one has to 
look into his explanation of the concept action. Taylor (1980:54-58) 
makes a distinction between humans as teleological systems and mere 
physical teleological systems. In physical systems tensions “would be 
measured in terms of force” and we “would not want to speak of ‘action’ 
here”. In humans, we need “something more” to identify a movement as 
action. This “something more” will be found in the “‘direction’ of an action” 
which can be identified “independently of its antecedent condition”. Thus, 
about systems that act “it can be said that they direct their behaviour” 
which cannot be said about systems that merely move. Humans “can be 
considered agents” or “directors”, to whom “responsibility can be attri­
buted for their behaviour in a special sense”. This then assumes a centre 
of responsibility which is also the locus of interpretation. Taylor (1985a: 
202) therefore declares that the “significance feature is at the centre of 
human life”. Now, there does not seem to be any difference between a 
centre of responsibility and a centre of subjective power. They are each 
other’s reverse sides. One can not take responsibility for something you 
have not originated or are able to do. Thus, although Taylor buys into the 
decentring discourse, and although he does not restrict the locus of
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behaviour to the intentional levels of behaviour, he simultaneously seems 
to elevate the intentional level above the rest of the human diversity.
Taylor’s hierarchy between human aspects is underlined when he 
attempts to distinguish between things, animals and humans. For Taylor 
(1985a:97-98, 101-104, 201; 1991:263) “it is clear that persons are a 
sub-class of agents”, which means that humans and animals share the 
feature of agency but not that of being a person. The difference between 
organisms (human beings and animals) on the one hand, and machines 
or things on the other, lies in the former being agents. Taylor (1980:66­
67; 1985a:98-99, 102, 192-197, 201; 1988:450-451; 1991:259-264) lo­
cates this agency in the capacity to “attribute significance to things”. 
Furthermore, this fact that “things matter to agents” creates in them 
“purposes, desires, aversions”. To Taylor, this view supplies the funda­
mental distinction between agents (human and animal) and things he is 
looking for. Machines can have only “derivative purpose”; outside of the 
designer or user’s context; they do not have any purposes of themselves, 
whereas in the case of humans and animals we can “ascribe action to 
them and distinguish, in their behaviour, between action and movement”. 
Organisms are distinguished by their ability to interpret their inner and 
outer contexts which gives them the power to posit their own goals and 
act autonomously. A thing, on the other hand, is fully heteronomously 
determined.
A further problem is to distinguish between a human person and an 
animal agent. The difference Taylor sees between things and organisms 
is about the difference between autonomy and heteronomy; autonomous 
power is vested in the interpretative capacity that is not inside beings 
without it. Taylor extends this difference also to the difference between 
humans and animals. Because the significance feature, and thus having 
purposes, belong to both, Taylor (1980:70-71; 1985a:201) cannot make 
a clear difference between humans and animals. He nevertheless 
operates also with a hierarchical continuum. At the lower end are 
“beetles” for whom “such concepts as ‘action’, and even more, ‘desire’ ... 
seem less and less appropriate”. At the other end of the continuum are 
humans and higher animals that are not only teleological systems but 
systems that are also purposive in nature. The only avenue of distinction 
between animals and human beings for Taylor (1985a:102; 1991:263­
264) is therefore to look for “matters of significance for human beings 
which are peculiarly human”. But then the problem is still to define the 
“peculiarly human”. This he finds in “matters of pride, shame, moral 
goodness, evil, dignity, the sense of worth, the various human forms of 
love, and so on”. However, it is questionable to imply that animals are 
totally incapable of significances like pride, shame, love etc.
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Taylor, nevertheless, has another difference in mind: Humans have a 
stronger ability for attributing significance or meaning than animals. For 
Taylor (1980:64-65, 67-70) “self-avowal makes an enormous difference” 
in the sense that “human beings are conscious of what they are reacting 
to in the way that animals are not”. A human being can, for instance, fear 
a lion because he has picked out the lion “as" something to be feared. In 
another situation, for instance in a game park, the lion is not something 
to be feared but an object of entertainment or enjoyment. For an 
antelope the lion is simply something to fear, he does not think of the lion 
“as” something to fear. This then is “a reduced form of consciousness”. 
This means that the “behaviour of animals can be accounted for simply 
by a set of species laws, a number of natural tendencies towards certain 
types of activity”. In humans, on the other hand, “a factor of variance is 
introduced” because their search for goals “is dependent on the idea they 
have of these goals, the way they describe them to themselves”.
The underlying tendency in Taylor’s distinction between humans and 
animals is to give humans a stronger interpretative ability. This stronger 
intra-ability also seems to give humans more power in the world in which 
they find themselves. However, it seems as if Taylor cannot progress to 
a qualitative difference between humans and animals. Humans are 
merely more developed interpreters than animals8. Now, Taylor’s 
struggle to firstly allocate the significance aspect exclusively to orga­
nisms and then to try and make it stronger in human agents, betrays an 
elevation of the significance aspect to the prime human ability.
However, we should be subtler and ask whether his centring of 
significance is indeed dangerous. I have closed my analysis of Gergen 
with the remark that for an advocate of selflessness he paradoxically 
assumes a concept of originating subjectivity. This, says Taylor 
(1985b: 173-174; 1989a:456), is a peculiar trait of twentieth century 
modernism: On the one hand, it “has gone more inward” than 
Romanticism, “even to celebrate subjectivity”. But, simultaneously it has 
profoundly decentred the subject. According to Taylor, this double 
feature indicates a simultaneous “slide to subjectivism and an anti­
subjectivist thrust”. From this paradox he infers that there “must be 
something between total subjectivism, on the one hand, holding that 
there are no undesigned patterns in history, and the strange Schopen- 
hauerism-without-the-will” of postmodernists, on the other hand. There­
fore, he says, to “give an absolute priority to the structure makes exactly
8 Landesman (1966:330-331) also argues that Taylor has “a problem in dealing with the 
higher animals other than men to whom teleological discourse seems to apply as 
well’'.
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as little sense as the equal and opposite error of subjectivism, which 
gave absolute priority to action as a kind of total beginning”.
This analysis of current tendencies translates also into a more personal 
view for Taylor. Taylor (1985a:103, 189; 1991:261, 264-366) indeed talks 
of a “transformation” of significances which means the person creates 
himself with his self-interpretations. This implies that what “we are at any 
moment is, one might say, partly constituted by our self-understanding”. 
Important in the latter statement is his use of the word “partly”. It would 
be difficult to convince Taylor to reject his deep-rooted affinity with the 
Romantic centring of subjective power in the creatively interpreting 
ability. However, it is at the same time clear that he is not an unabashed 
centrist. Human creative power, although the trademark of the truly 
human, is only partial.
The background to his use of the word “partly” lies in his description of 
current thinking. Modern (i.e. current) thinkers, Taylor (1989a:441-446, 
456-461) says, are, like the Romantics, opposed to the Enlightenment’s 
instrumental reason that is “shallow and debased”. Romanticism 
countered this with a return to nature and feeling. However, the current 
return to nature is not totally what it was before. Although nature is still 
seen as a power which “comes to expression in things”, it is no longer a 
“"spiritual source of good but a wild, and blind drive”. This, however, 
does not compel us to capitulate before shallowness; a return to 
interiority by means of the inner powers of the self is still possible. The 
“lived experience or creative activity underlying our awareness of the 
world” has to be recovered -  it is “through the articulations of the creative 
imagination that the wild drive is tapped and transmuted into beauty” . 
The notion of “wild and blind” nature can be seen as a restriction to 
subjective powers; that the celebration of our own powers of creativity 
will not be unlimited.
Indeed, this undecided position9 is not unfamiliar to the current 
decentring of the self. Derrida (1991:96-97, 103-105, 109) for instance 
claims that his deconstruction of the self does not “sought to ‘liquidate’” 
the subject. What he questions is predicates like “identity to self, 
positionality, property, personality, ego, consciousness, will intentionality, 
freedom, humanity, etc.”. In its place he asks for a discussion in which 
the subject is to be “reinterpreted, displaced, decentered, re-inscribed”. 
He will therefore especially endorse a concept of the self that “would no
9 This is also Lemmens’ (1994:126) view: “Schipperend tussen appreciate en kritische 
afstandelijkheid poogt Taylor nu aan te tonen hoe de belangrijkste morele tradities 
van de ambigue zelfinterpretatie van het hedendaagse zelf inaugureren".
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longer include the figure of mastery of self, of adequation to self, center 
and origin of the world, etc.”10.
It is this tension Taylor observes between self-creation and the current 
sense of the aggressiveness of the world. It is a tension that can be 
found in graphic detail in Rorty’s ponderings of the self-creative acts of 
human beings. Rorty (1993:30-33, 35-36) admits that his idea that “the 
mind is a poetry-making faculty’’ may seem to be a return to the “idea of 
an intrinsic human nature” -  something he would try to escape from. 
Rorty nevertheless and paradoxically so11, affirms the notion that “shared 
by all of us” is “a faculty for creating”. He even sees it as “the distinctively 
human, as opposed to animal, portion of each human life”. Rorty 
(1993:27-29) sees self-creation as an attempt to escape from “inherited 
descriptions”. Rorty (1993:40-43) nevertheless feels the need to mitigate 
the “strong poet”. He can in the end not avoid seeing the self as also 
dependent on a context that she does not fully control. This tempered 
claim of the se lf s capabilities is not only true of its relation to other selves 
but also of the relation to the world. This is where the theme of 
victimisation announces itself most explicitly in Rorty. Although Rorty 
(1993:40) argues that the world should be "de-divinized” it can still “have 
power over us -  for example, the power to kill us”. How do we counter 
this power? According to Rorty the only stance we can adopt is “to 
recognize contingency and pain’’ and to still try to remake the world 
because “this is the only sort of power over the world which we can hope 
to have’’.
For Taylor the human being is not a total given, her capacity for self­
interpretation assumes self-creative acts. But, like an important strain in 
current thinking, Taylor acknowledges the violent limits to this self­
creation. Taylor therefore also subverts the centrism of self-creative 
power with the addition of the concept “partly” . However, to be partially 
detached from the centrist image is also to be partially part of it.
10 This decentring of the self without liquidating it, bespeaks an underlying tension. The 
background to this is the struggle against metaphysics. Deconstruction therefore sees 
itself as an attempt to cause disruptions and displacements. It does not intend fixed 
conclusions but wants to be “aporetic”, to bring about paradoxes without solutions 
(Van Peursen, 1995:42, 45-46). The goal of deconstruction is to indicate the 
conceptual distinctions of the author and his incoherent use of these concepts. The 
standards and criteria of the text itself are therefore used to disturb and uproot the 
text; the text is failing according to its own criteria (Sarup, 1989:37).
11 Hollis (1991:244-245) also finds Rorty's rejection of the centred self but affirmation of 
the “poetic” self, contradictory.
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5. Resolution
Current thinking on the subjective power of the self has moved into an 
irredeemably paradoxical position. This position puts the self in the 
situation of being both victimised and victimiser. This seems to be 
Gergen's and also Taylor’s viewpoint. The aim is to curb the overrating of 
the power of the self and to transform it to a more realistic perspective. 
Gergen’s, but especially Taylor’s view sometimes leaves the popular 
postmodern impression that we are left with a view of the self in conflict 
with himself and his environment. Part of the reason for this is probably 
the partial centring of the self in his creative capacity that resides in 
either interpretation or social construction (which is society’s version of 
interpretation). These two thinkers do not take care to disperse agency 
power to more than these capacities. A centred self gives an immanent 
driving force to the universe as holistic system. Such an immanentism 
will necessarily lead to a contest between aspects of this system for 
leadership. Therefore, if reality tries to enforce “wild and blind” meaning, 
it will clash with our attempt to give human meaning to life. In a non­
centred systemic view on the other hand, the self should be part of a 
broader universe of meaning and the reason for agonism will fade.
Because a fixed centring gives a reductive and impoverished image of 
the human being, the decentring of the traditional view of the self is a 
useful and necessary exercise. However, a one-sided focus on this 
critique has the effect of repressing the human origin of actions and 
behaviour, albeit only a partial origin. In other words, after the decentring 
of the self, we need a re-centring of the self to empower and unify the 
postmodern fragmented and disempowered self. The decentring of the 
self indeed implies an aporetic or agonistic strategy in which both 
autonomous and heteronomous powers are uphold12. We will therefore 
have to accommodate the issues that initially have given life to the 
classical self. Here we should especially deal with the quest for an agent 
who can be responsible for historical, moral and knowing actions. The 
oscillation between the contradictions of humanism and anti-humanism 
should show the way to a more fundamental task: We should, with the 
gained knowledge of the decentring of the self, once again try to give a 
transcendental critique of the self; that is, we should once again try to 
formulate the conditions for a coherent and responsible human 
existence. The aborted death of the self is essentially a cry for an accept­
Olthuis (1993:23) says for instance about the inter-centred self that "the healthy 
decentring of the modernist self as self-centring need not lead to the postmodern non­
self, but to a recentring of self in relation of love in community"
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able reformulation of the conditions for being human as empowered 
identity.
The empowerment of all human aspects will assume a re-centring of 
these aspects. It is obvious that we cannot embark on a simultaneous 
recentring of all aspects in all situations. This means the situation will to 
some extent determine the re-centring of a relevant human aspect. This 
concept is (partly) akin to what Rorty interprets Freud to have done. In 
the process of de-divining the self, Rorty (1993:32-33) argues, Freud 
“makes it possible for us to see science and poetry, genius and psycho­
sis -  and, most importantly, morality and prudence -  not as products of 
distinct faculties but as alternative modes of adaptation”. To this we can 
add Oksenberg Rorty’s and Wong’s (1990:19-20) perspective that a 
“person’s identity is constituted by a configuration of central traits” and 
that the “question of whether a trait is part of a person’s identity generally 
has no simple and univocal answer; it is contextually subscripted to one 
or more dimensions of centrality”. Identity traits and human capabilities 
are coping skills. If the scientific situation is considered for instance, the 
analytical capacity of the scientist needs to be in the centre of his 
behaviour. Other capacities are then, in various degrees, on the 
periphery. Something like the emotions of the scientist will clearly be a lot 
further from this centre. But in a situation where expression of love is 
called for, the centre will be filled with emotion and cool analysis will have 
to take a lesser position.
We can thus state as principle that a moderate return of the initiating self 
(agency) should assume agency in a plurality of aspects. At the same 
time, however, this plurality of agency-functions should be exercised in 
coherence and inter-dependence with one another, as well as the 
environment and “other” of the self (as coherence of agency aspects). 
This picture of the coherence of a plurality has the double advantage of a 
decentring and recentring. It decentres in the sense that a systemic view 
of the relation between aspects is created. This means aspects define 
one another’s power; the subjective power of aspects is relative to one 
another. Coherence nevertheless also makes the recentring of power 
possible in the sense that those aspects that were decentred because of 
the totalitarian centring of one aspect, are empowered again.
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